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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Russell Davis entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to deliver. On appeal, Mr. Davis asserts the district 
court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the fall of 2012, several officers from the Mountain Home Police Department, 
and four agents from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) executed a 
search warrant on an apartment and the occupants' vehicles in Mountain Horne 
Apartment B202 at the Green's Place complex. (R., pp.50-52; Tr. 10/21/13, p.27, Ls.6-
10, p.16, Ls.12-16.) Mr. Davis was not a resident of the apartment complex. (R., p.50.) 
Apartment B202 is a second-floor apartment within Building B, a "quad-plex," which 
contains two apartments on the first floor and two apartments on the second floor. 
(Tr. 10/21/13, p.66, Ls.12-20.) There are two parking areas for the complex: a rear 
parking lot, and a front parking lot with carports, where residents typically park. 
(Tr. 10/21/13, p.10, Ls.1-14.) A breezeway, which connects the two parking lots, 
separates Building B from Building A. (Tr. 10/21/13, p.37, Ls.8-9.) 
Apartment B202 was the residence of Aaron Clifford, Cody Ferrier, and Blake 
Ferris. (R., p.50; Tr. 10/21/13, p.7, Ls.9-17.) And, because Mr. Clifford was a member 
of the Air Force, OSI agents were assigned to assist the Mountain Home police officers 
with the search. (R., p.51.) However, the agents remained downstairs, in front of 
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Building B, throughout the majority of the search, while the police officers conducted the 
actual search of the apartment upstairs. (Tr. 10/21/13, p.10, Ls.1 1, Ls.3-21.) 
Approximately two hours after the search started, Mr. Davis arrived at the 
apartment complex and parked in the rear parking lot, behind Building B. (R., p.52.) 
OSI Agent Thompson heard a vehicle arrive, looked down the breezeway, and saw a 
red SUV. (Tr. 10/21/13, p.11, Ls.10-12.) Agent Thompson testified that Mr. Davis then 
walked through the breezeway and turned toward the agents, who were standing in 
front of Building B. (Tr. 10/21/13, p.11, Ls.12-17.) Agent Thompson said Mr. Davis 
hesitated briefly when he saw the agents but then continued walking toward them. 
(Tr. 10/21 /13, p.11, Ls.15-17.) At that moment, he was approached by one of the other 
agents, Agent Shaiyah, who shook his hand and asked him for his name. (Tr. 10/21/13, 
p.11, Ls.17-20.) When Agent Shaiyah stopped him, Mr. Davis was standing on the 
sidewalk, between the carports and the entrance to Building B. (Tr. 10/21/13, p.12, 
Ls.11-17.) 
Mr. Davis told Agent Shaiyah his name, and Agent Thompson overheard their 
conversation, so he went upstairs to tell the officers that someone had arrived at the 
complex. (Tr. 10/21/13, p.13, Ls.11-15.) In the meantime, Agent Shaiyah questioned 
Mr. Davis, then asked him to take a seat on the curb, and Mr. Davis complied. 
(Tr. 10/21/13, p.61, Ls.1-5.) Shortly thereafter, Agent Thompson came back downstairs 
with Officer Jessup. (Tr. 10/2/13, p.14, Ls.4-6.) Although Officer Jessup had 
confiscated Mr. Ferrier's cell phone during the search of the apartment and discovered 
text messages from Mr. Davis that led him to believe Mr. Davis was going to bring 
marijuana to the apartment, he did not communicate this information to the OSI agents 
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downstairs, outside of the building. (Tr. 10/21/13, p.27, L.18 - p.35, L.24, p.42, L.16 -
p.43, L.21) 
Officer Jessup testified that, when he went downstairs, he told Mr. Davis that he 
knew why he was there because he had seen the text messages. (Tr. 10/21/13, p.36, 
L.7 - p.39, L.18.) Officer Jessup also testified that he saw a large bulge in Mr. Davis's 
pocket, and he "poked at it" with his radio antenna and asked Mr. Davis what it was. 
(Tr. 10/2/13, p.39, L.23 - p.40, L.8.) After that, he told Mr. Davis to stand up so he 
could pat him down. (Tr. 10/21/13, p.40. Ls.9-12.) During the pat-down, he discovered 
a one-ounce bag of marijuana. (Tr. 10/21/13, p.41, L.24 p.42, L.1.) 
Mr. Davis was subsequently arrested and charged with possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver. (Tr. 10/2·1/13, p.49, Ls.15-17; R., pp.18-19.) 
He filed a motion to suppress, and a memorandum in support of the motion, arguing 
that his initial detention, and the subsequent search, violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights. (R., pp.22-30.) After a hearing, the district court denied the motion. (R., pp.50-
57.) Mr. Davis then entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to deliver; the plea preserved the ability to challenge 
the district court's order denying his motion to suppress. (Tr. 11 /8/13, p.5, Ls.14-17.) In 
exchange, the State agreed to recommend a period of retained jurisdiction with an 
underlying sentence of five years, with two years fixed. (Tr. 11 /8/13, p.5. L.18 - p.6, 
L.1.) 
At the sentencing hearing, Mr Davis's counsel requested that the court impose a 
sentence of three years, with one year fixed, but suspend the sentence and place 
Mr. Davis on probation. (Tr. 1/6/14, p.93, Ls.11-4.) The district court imposed a unified 
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sentence of five years, with one and one-half fixed, but retained jurisdiction and 
recommended that Mr. Davis participate in a CAPP rider. (Tr. 1/6/14, p.99, Ls.19- 24.) 
~v1r. Davis then filed a Notice of Appeal that was timely from the judgment of conviction 
and order of retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.82-84.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court's denial of Mr. Davis's motion to suppress was error because 
Mr. Davis was never in the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched and there 
was no nexus between Mr. Davis and the activity giving rise to the search at the time of 
his detention 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Davis's Motion To Suppress Because 
Mr. Davis Was Never In The Immediate Vicinity Of The Premises To Be Searched And 
There Was No Nexus Between Mr. Davis And The Activity Giving Rise To The Search 
At The Time Of His Detention 
A. Introduction 
Russell Davis entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to deliver, preserving his right to challenge the 
district court's order denying his Motion to Suppress. Mr. Davis asserts that the district 
court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress because his initial detention violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact 
that were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 
(Ct. App. 1996). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Davis's Motion To Suppress 
Because Mr. Davis Was Not In The Immediate Vicinity Of The Premises 
Described In The Search Warrant. Apartment B202 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 
17 of the Idaho Constitution both protect "[t]he right to the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. art. 1, § 17. The purpose of these constitutional 
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rights is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the of discretion by 
governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and security against 
arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002). Thus 
searches or detentions conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 
125, 129 (Ct. App. 2002). 
Here, Mr. Davis was detained without a warrant although he was not an occupant 
of the premises described in the warrant. When law enforcement officers are executing 
a search warrant on a property, officers are allowed to briefly detain the occupants of 
the premises described in the warrant. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 
( 1981 ). There, police detained Mr. Summers who was "descending the front steps" of 
the premises described in the warrant when the police arrived to execute a search 
warrant for contraband. Id. at 693. Once the police discovered narcotics in the home, 
and learned that Mr. Summers owned the home, they arrested him, and found heroin on 
his person. Id. He filed a motion to suppress the heroin as the fruit of an illegal search, 
and the motion was granted. Id. at 694. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the 
evidence was admissible because it was Mr. Summers's home that was being 
searched. Id. at 705. As the Court explained, "a warrant to search for contraband 
founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain 
occupants of the premises while a proper search is being conducted." Id. at 705. This 
limited authority to detain occupants arises for three important reasons identified by the 
Court: 1) preventing the flight of the occupants, 2) minimizing the potential for harm to 
law enforcement, and 3) facilitating the completion of the search. Id. at 702-03. 
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The United States Supreme Court recently limited the application of Summers 
provided factors to consider when determining whether a detention is legal. 
See Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013). There, police officers detained an 
occupant of a residence that was subject to search after the occupant had left the 
residence and driven a mile away. Id. at 1036. The Court said that because the 
exception in Summers "grants substantial authority to police officers to detain outside of 
the traditional rules of the Fourth Amendment, it must be circumscribed. A spatial 
constraint defined by the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched is therefore 
required for detentions incident to the execution of a search warrant." Id. at 1042 
(emphasis added). The Court went on to say that the search of a residence "has a 
spatial dimension, and so a spatial or geographical boundary can be used to determine 
the area within which both the search and detention incident to that search may occur." 
Id. 
In applying that rule, the Bailey Court held the defendant was "detained at a point 
beyond any reasonable understanding of the immediate vicinity of the premises in 
question" and therefore the "search-related law enforcement interests" were diminished 
and "the intrusiveness of the detention" was more severe. Id. The Court also 
acknowledged that not every situation would be as obvious and therefore listed three 
factors to consider when the spatial boundaries delineating the immediate vicinity of a 
particular property were not as clear. Id. Those are "the lawful limits of the premises, 
whether the occupant was within the line of sight of his dwelling, the ease of reentry 
from the occupant's location, and other relevant factors." Id. Thus, under Bailey 
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detentions beyond the "immediate vicinity of premises" described in a warrant are 
illegal. 
Idaho courts have relied on Summers to extend permissible seizures to include 
detentions of people who are "found on the premises to be searched who are not readily 
ascertainable as residents or occupants." State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 296, 298 (Ct. App. 
2002). There, the Court of Appeals held that a defendant who was standing in the 
driveway of a home when police arrived could be detained to determine his identity and 
relationship to the premises. Id. at 301. Similarly, it has held that a defendant who 
walked through the front yard of a home being searched could be detained for the 
limited purpose of determining his identity and connection to the house. State v. Kester, 
137 Idaho 643, 647 (Ct. App. 2002). 
The Pierce Court adopted much of its reasoning from a California case, People v. 
Glaser, 902 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1995). Pierce, 137 Idaho at 299-300. There, when officers 
arrived to execute a search warrant, they detained a man at gunpoint as he was about 
to enter a backyard gate behind the house to be searched. Id. at 731. Applying 
Summers, the Glaser Court allowed the detention because the government's interests 
in police safety and in determining the potential connection of the defendant to the 
property were legitimate concerns in that case. Id. at 735. Additionally, the Court noted 
that the detention was very brief and did not occur in a public place. Id. 
However, the Glaser Court explicitly rejected the State's proposed rule that "the 
mere arrival or presence of someone at the warranted premises, by itself, justifies a 
detention for the purpose of determining identity and connection to the searched 
premises." Id. at 739. The Court explained that such a "blanket approval of detentions 
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in the course of searches would present too great a danger 'of slippage into a guilt by 
association pattern whereby anyone seen near prospective drug activity becomes fair 
game for a stop and frisk."' Id. (citing United States v. Reid, 997 F.2d 1576, 1579 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993)). That is precisely what happened here. Mr. Davis was a passerby. He was 
not an occupant of Apartment 8202, the premises described in the warrant, and he was 
not inside or in the immediate vicinity of the premises. And prior to his detention, the Air 
Force agents had no reason to believe he had any connection to Apartment B202 or its 
residents, much less any illegal activity. 
1. Mr. Davis Was Not Within The Immediate Vicinity Of Apartment B202 
When He Was Detained, And Holding Otherwise Would Allow Law 
Enforcement To Detain All Occupants And Visitors Of Any Apartment 
Complex 
Mr. Davis was detained on a public sidewalk, in the common area of an 
apartment complex. Nevertheless, the district court relied on Pierce, Glaser, Kester, 
and Summers to find the detention reasonable. ( See R., p.54) But all four of those 
cases have a crucial common thread: the defendant was in the immediate vicinity of the 
premises - either on the entry stairs, in the driveway, or in the yard of a private home 
that was the subject of a warrant. The situation here was dramatically different. Here, 
the subject of the warrant was Apartment 8202 and its residents' vehicles, not the entire 
apartment complex, or even all of Building B. (R., p.50.) The public sidewalk on the 
complex common area is not within the immediate vicinity of Apartment 8202, a 
second-story apartment in a four-plex building within a larger apartment complex. 
Mr. Davis parked in a parking area near Building B and was walking in a common 
area; he had not even turned toward the stairs when he was detained by Agent 
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Shaiyah. (Tr. 10/21/1 p.1 Ls.11-14.) And the OSI agent in charge of the operation 
admitted that he did not know if Mr. Davis was going to Apartment 8202. (Tr. 10/21/13, 
p.66, Ls.14-23.) Indeed, none of the agents outside the building who detained him had 
any reason to believe Mr. Davis was an occupant of, or even a visitor to, Apartment 
8202. They had no articulable basis for suspecting any criminal activity at the moment 
they detained him. 
Additionally, the Bailey factors are relevant and helpful here to determine 
whether Mr. Davis was in the immediate vicinity of the premises. Mr. Davis was 
obviously not within the lawful limits of Apartment B202. It is not clear whether he could 
see Apartment 8202 from the sidewalk where he was standing, but he certainly did not 
have any ability to enter the apartment from the sidewalk on the ground level; he had 
not even attempted to go up the stairs. Therefore, he was not in the immediate vicinity 
of Apartment B202. 
And yet, the district court said that "[w]hen the Defendant turned toward building 
B2021 and walked on the sidewalk ... adjacent to the parking lot where residents 
parked their vehicles, he was sufficiently on the premises being searched to be detained 
by the agents to determine his identity and connection to the premises." (R., p.54, 
emphasis added.) This was error. 
Given the United States Supreme Court's concern about the intrusiveness of 
these detentions, the immediate vicinity of a second-floor apartment in an apartment 
complex must be limited to the apartment itself and perhaps the front landing directly in 
front of the door. Any expansion of that vicinity would legitimize detentions of any other 
1 It appears this is a typographical error, as the building itself was simply "Building B." 
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occupants or visitors to the entire building. Taken to its logical conclusion, this rule 
would also allow large-scale detentions of anyone who tried to walk a 50-story 
apartment building in a large city while a search was occurring in one of the apartments. 
2. There Was No Nexus Between Mr. Davis And The Activity Giving Rise To 
The Search Warrant At The Time Agent Shaiyah Detained Him 
The Idaho case the district court should have relied on for this situation is State v. 
Reynolds, 143 Idaho 911 (Ct. App. 2007).2 There, probation and police officers were 
conducting a search of a business owned by a probationer. Id. at 912. The building to 
be searched was adjacent to Mr. Reynolds's residence and shop, and the structures 
were separated by a 15-foot open area. Id. at 91 As the officers were executing the 
search, an officer saw Mr. Reynolds in the open area, recognized him from previous 
incidents, and ordered him to stop. Id. Mr. Reynolds did not stop but continued walking 
into his shop. Id. When he came back out, however, the officer detained him and 
conducted a frisk during which he saw a pipe that contained methamphetamine residue. 
Id. Mr. Reynolds was subsequently arrested. Id. 
The State attempted to argue that the reasoning from Summers and Pierce 
should apply. Id. at 915. But the Court held that the record did not "establish any nexus 
between Reynolds and the criminal activity giving rise to the probation search at the 
time that the officer stopped him." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, in Reynolds, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals addressed the question at issue here. In fact, it actually stated that 
"[e]ven if the officers had been conducting a search pursuant to a warrant instead of a 
2 Mr. Davis's counsel referenced this case in his briefing and in his closing argument, 
but the district court did not acknowledge it in its decision. (R., p.26; Tr. 10/21/13, p.74, 
Ls.10-23.) 
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probation search, this Court's holding in Kester and Pierce only authorized the detention 
of individuals found on the premises being searched when their identity and connection 
to the premises are unknown." Id. (emphasis in original). The district court erred in not 
following Reynolds. 
When Mr. Davis was detained, he did not pose a risk to the completion of the 
search or to the officers' safety. Additionally, Air Force OSI Agent Shaiyah was aware 
of no nexus between Mr. Davis and the criminal activity that gave rise to the warrant. 
And, most importantly, when Mr. Davis was detained, he was not within the immediate 
vicinity of Apartment 8202. He was on a public sidewalk. Therefore, his detention was 
illegal. 
3. Any Evidence Obtained As A Result Of Mr. Davis's Illegal Detention Must 
Be Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of Illegal Government Activity 
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate for 
evidence that is the fruit of illegal government activity. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249 (1990). The test is "whether, 
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is 
made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged the primary taint." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 448. 
Suppression is required if "the evidence sought to be suppressed would not have come 
to light but for the government's unconstitutional conduct." State v. Wigginton, 142 
Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Here, Agent Shaiyah illegally detained Mr. Davis. Had Mr. Davis not been 
illegally detained, the evidence located in his pocket would not have been discovered. 
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Therefore, all the evidence collected after the impermissible detention must be 
suppressed as fruit of the illegal governmental activity. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Davis respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment 
of conviction and order of retained jurisdiction, reverse the order denying his motion to 
suppress, and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings. 
DA TED this 22nd day of September, 2014. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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